The Law Review Selection Process: An Analysis of Its Disparate Impact on Minority Students by Roberts Sarnoski, Dorene
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice
Volume 7 | Issue 3 Article 5
1989
The Law Review Selection Process: An Analysis of
Its Disparate Impact on Minority Students
Dorene Roberts Sarnoski
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
Dorene Roberts Sarnoski, The Law Review Selection Process: An Analysis of Its Disparate Impact on Minority Students, 7 Law & Ineq. 459
(1989).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol7/iss3/5
The Law Review Selection Process: An Analysis
of Its Disparate Impact on Minority Students
Dorene Roberts Sarnoski*
Introduction
As first year law students complete their last exams, they
should experience a feeling of relief, even euphoria, that the
dreaded "IL" year has come to an end. Instead, they exhibit char-
acteristics such as agitation, nervousness, and stress. Why? After
completing what may have been the worst year of their lives, these
new "2Ls" are faced with a distressing choice. They must decide
whether to enter the writing competition for membership on law
review.1 Many law students choose to compete. There are over
two hundred2 law schools in the United States and almost all pub-
lish at least one law review.3 This means an impressive number of
students put themselves through the grueling process of legal anal-
ysis and writing required by the competition. Students submit to
the process knowing that only a small percentage4 of those who
apply will be selected. Law students endure the competition be-
cause the benefits of law review far outweigh the costs of compet-
ing. The law review competition is part of law school culture and
has been for over one hundred years.5 The benefits and prestige of
law review membership have been recognized and passed on from
law professor to student, from employer to law graduate, and from
law partner to associate. "When students arrive at law school,
they ... no longer hear such common expressions as 'She is a top
student,' or 'He is a good student.' [S]uch status is described only
* B.S., Northern Illinois University (1986); J.D., University of Minnesota
(1990).
1. In some cases they may not yet be "2Ls," as the law review competition at
some law schools takes place after mid-terms rather than after finals.
2. Ronald D. Rotunda, Law Reviews-The Extreme Centrist Position, 62 Ind.
L.J. 1, 8 (1986) (adapted from a speech given at the annual Indiana Law Journal
banquet on April 11, 1986).
3. Id.
4. See generally Howard C. Westwood, Law Review Should Become the Law
School, 31 Va. L. Rev. 913 (1945).
5. Rotunda, supra note 2, at 5 (reference to first Harvard Law Review in
1887).
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with the words 'law review': as in 'He is law review.' "6
All law students, however, have not had access to the benefits
and prestige of law review membership. This article suggests that
the typical selection process has resulted in a significant under-
representation of minority students on law reviews. This is not to
suggest that the selection procedures have purposely discriminated
against minority students, but only that, purposeful or not, the re-
sult has been disproportionate. This underrepresentation has de-
nied benefits to minority students that have been widely available
to non-minority students. The purpose of this article is to docu-
ment the result of the present law review selection process as it
relates to minority students, and to analyze this result under the
disparate impact 7 theory of discrimination.
Part I provides a broad overview of the benefits derived from
law review membership and the consequences suffered by minor-
ity students as a result of their underrepresentation. Part II out-
lines the survey format and procedures used to gather and test the
statistical data. Part III analyzes Supreme Court opinions applying
the disparate impact theory. Although these opinions deal with
employment discrimination, the author proposes that law reviews
should be guided by the overall purpose of the decisions. Finally,
Part IV suggests some changes that should be instituted to correct
the disproportionate absence of minority students from law review
membership.
Part I: Benefits of Law Review Membership
The inequality of the law review selection process carries no
significance unless minority students are somehow disadvantaged
by not being members. The United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that discrimination is unlawful only if it results in a "sig-
nificant deprivation of a benefit .... "8 The benefits of law review
membership include: (1) direct educational achievement; (2) indi-
rect educational gains; and (3) advantages beyond academia.
Direct educational achievement through law review member-
ship is undeniable. Most students, faculty, practicing lawyers9 and
6. Frank Kubler, Confusion, obfuscation, humiliation, and hardship: Is this
really the only way to learn the law?, Student Lawyer, Nov. 1985, at 10, 11.
7. The Supreme Court has found that discrimination can sometimes be estab-
lished by focusing on the consequences of a neutral selection process rather than
the intent to discriminate. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 295 (1979).
9. For a discussion on educational benefits of law reviews, see Richard Fried-
man, Making Law Review: What Price Glory?, Student Lawyer, Dec. 1976, at 34;
Francis L. Kenney, Jr., The Law Review Priesthood, Learning and the Law, Winter
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judges10 would agree that law review functions as a teaching tool
within the law school. During the first year of law school, stu-
dents are systematically fed the same information, given identical
reading assignments, and exposed to the socratic method-all as a
means of learning the law. First year legal writing instruction at-
tempts to provide a measure of private tutorial assistance. A stu-
dent can thus take advantage of some individual attention to
improve writing style, research methods, and critical analysis.
Once second year begins, the intensive and individualized training
in applied legal analysis is severely curtailed for those who are not
on law review.1 ' Law review members are challenged and exposed
to an "independent, intensified learning experience."1 2 The law
review experience gives members an additional learning experi-
ence, not available to anyone the first year. Members select topics
of personal interest, research the area thoroughly, write an article,
and receive extensive feedback from editors on each submitted
draft of the article. In general, the other law students, particularly
minority students, continue along much the same course as in the
first year. Non-members experience fewer opportunities outside
the classroom to apply the law and techniques they are learning.13
Non-members continue to learn the law, but the benefits of im-
proved writing, research, and editing14 that they receive are "insig-
nificant"' 5 when compared to those for law review members.
In addition to the direct educational opportunities, there are
also indirect benefits from law review membership. One such in-
tangible benefit is increased status in the law school community.
In a recent study, members listed status second only to employ-
ment benefits as the reason they sought to be on law review.16
This elevated status often results in more attention from faculty
1975, at 61 (results of a survey of law review editors and deans at forty-eight law
schools); Robert E. Riggs, The Law Review Experience: The Participant View, 31 J.
Legal Ed. 646 (1982) (study of past and present law review members at Brigham
Young University asking their opinions on the law review experience).
10. Rotunda, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting Chief Justice Hughes about the influ-
ence of law review articles on the Court),
11. Westwood, supra note 4, at 913.
12. Kenney, supra note 9, at 62 (quoting the questionnaire response of the
Southern Methodist Law School dean).
13. Westwood, supra note 4, at 913. Even with curriculum changes in many law
schools, such as clinics and moot courts, non-members are not exposed to the inten-
sive research training and editing attention that members receive.
14. Riggs, supra note 9, at 650. Riggs found these three skills to be the educa-
tional benefits most valued by law review participants.
15. Kenney, supra note 9, at 64 (quoting the questionnaire response of the
Southern Methodist Law School dean).




members17 and exemption from classroom participation.' 8 Law re-
view students are viewed as special by deans, faculty, and other
students, and are treated as such.19 If minority students are con-
sistently denied membership on law review, they are also consist-
ently denied this special treatment in law school. For example,
during the first year, status in the classroom may be a result of
preparation for class, expression of opinions, or even willingness to
debate with the professor. Students are approaching the task on
equally unsure footing. Beginning the second year, those students
on law review have the advantage of formal recognition of their
scholastic and/or writing prowess. The new membership list is
prominently displayed, so everyone knows who they are. It is
human nature for individuals to internalize others' judgment of
themselves. Accordingly, those who are recognized as superior
will perform as such.20 This is particularly true for minority stu-
dents, who have the constant burden of proving themselves. 21
Thus, this recognition becomes a very important opportunity for
them. As minority students continue to be denied law review
membership, they may judge themselves and be judged by others
as inferior students. This "inferiority" will in turn become a "self-
fulfilling prophecy" 22 for both individual minority students and
minorities as a group.
A second strand of the indirect educational benefits flowing
from membership is the opportunity to publish.23 Though all stu-
dents may submit articles to law review, only members are likely
to do so. Members tend to take advantage of their status as such
17. Kubler, supra note 6, at 12.
18. Kenney, supra note 9, at 64 (concluding that law review members are "per-
mitted a more relaxed attitude to class work").
19. Kenney, supra note 9, at 64. In contrast, students not on law review are
"consigned to second class citizenship." Id. at 61. See generally Westwood, supra
note 4.
20. For a general discussion of the effects of internalization on an individual's
performance, see H.C. Kelman, Compliance, Identification and Internalization:
Three Processes of Attitude Change, 2 J. of Conflict Resolution 51 (1958).
21. Roy L. Brooks, Anti-Minority Mindset in the Law School Personnel Process:
Toward an Understanding of Racial Mindsets, 5 Law & Inequality 1, 6-7 (1987).
22. Kenney, supra note 9, at 64. Kenney explains the "Pygmalion" effect and
how it functions in educational institutions. He believes law faculties have not yet
learned nor accepted that expectations of a student's behavior will reinforce that
behavior (quoting from Pygmalion in the Classroom by Robert Rosenthal and Le-
nore Jacobson). The scholastic performance differences between law review mem-
bers and non-members may be minimal. However, if minorities continue to be the
perpetual non-members, they will be viewed as having poorer scholastic abilities
than the non-minority students. See also R. Merton, Social Theory and Social
Structure (1957) (discussion of self-fulfilling prophecy).
23. See Riggs, supra note 9.
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and submit for publication. 24 Students who have already been re-
jected in the writing competition may tend to accept their status as
inferior writers and be discouraged from writing and submitting
articles for publication. Publication alone carries with it certain
benefits, such as prestige, job opportunities, and a chance to ex-
press viewpoints that may affect the law. A publication system
that systematically neglects minority viewpoints reduces, in turn,
opportunities for minorities to effect changes in the law. A dis-
criminatory selection process thus denies minority students the op-
portunity to influence 25 the direction of law26 because their
viewpoints are not published.
Finally, advantages exist beyond academia. Law review
membership confers undeniable benefits in employment opportu-
nities. Employers "woo" 27 law review members, lavishing special
attention 28 on those with such a credential. In a recent survey, law
review members ranked "employment asset" by far the number
one benefit of membership both before and after their law review
terms.29 There is no proof that the law review member will be a
better lawyer, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to overcome the
"general agreement among practicing lawyers that the Review
man [or woman] is much better prepared than the non-Review
man [or woman] for the practice of law ... ."30 Law students who
have taken part in the employment search are aware of the impact
of the law review label. The employment benefit has become so
obvious that it is possible to receive job offers by removing from
one's r~sum6 the typical student credential of G.P.A. and by re-
placing it with the honored title of "law review editor."31
Students who are denied admission to law review by the se-
lection process are denied the educational benefits that accrue to
members. They are also denied prestige within their class and em-
24. Not every student article is chosen for publication, but submission of an ar-
ticle is usually required for each member.
25. See Rotunda, supra note 2, at 3-4.
26. Friedman, supra note 9, at 35.
27. Rotunda, supra note 2, at 5.
28. Id.
29. Riggs, supra note 9, at 649-50. Respondents rated benefits from "very im-
portant" to "not important." A wide margin existed between respondents' ratings
of the employment benefit and any other benefit.
30. Westwood, supra note 4, at 914.
31. Friedman, supra note 9, at 36. Mr. Friedman had fair success searching for
a job while his G.P.A. was on his r6sum6. After being chosen as a Harvard Law
Review editor, he replaced the G.P.A. with his new title and was "offered a job by
every firm that saw him." See also David Eaves, I.P.L. Png & Mark Ramseyer,
Gender, Ethnicity and Grades: Empirical Evidence of Discrimination in Law-Firm
Interviews, 7 Law & Inequality 189 (1989).
1989]
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ployment opportunities. Membership has been characterized as a
"merry-go-round on which everyone gets a brass ring .... ,,32 Mi-
nority students are repeatedly denied the brass ring. The follow-
ing sections of this article show that the present selection process
for membership on law reviews has resulted in a disparate impact
on minority law students.
Part II: Explanation of Author's Research
In 1988, students at George Washington National Law Center
proposed an affirmative action plan for the law school's two jour-
nals.33 The purpose of the plan was to increase the "disproportion-
ately low" 34 minority membership. This research considers
whether George Washington National Law Center's journals are
alone in their disproportionately low minority membership or
whether the same disproportion is true of other schools' law
reviews.
Twenty law schools were surveyed. Table 1 presents an al-
phabetical listing of these schools. These particular law schools
were chosen for several reasons. First, they are spread geographi-
cally across the nation. This means that the sample reflects vary-
ing regional minority populations. The schools sampled have
minority populations ranging from seven percent to thirty-six per-
cent. Also, these schools are among the top law schools in the
United States.35 It is more probable that other law schools emu-
late the top schools than vice versa.36 Finally, the benefits37 de-
rived from membership on law review at one of the top law
schools are most readily recognized and accepted. For testing, the
schools were assigned random letters which appear on Table 2. In
order to protect the confidentiality of the law schools that took
part in the survey, the alphabetical listing on Table 1 is not cross-
referenced with the test results on Table 2. It is therefore not pos-
32. Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 Va. L. Rev. 279, 287
(1962).
33. Edward A. Adams, Affirmative Action Plan for Journal Stirs Debate at
George Washington, 10 Nat'l L. J., March 7, 1988, at 4.
34. Id.
35. See John Metaxes, U.S. Court Clerkships Still Luring Editors-in-Chief of
Law Reviews, 8 Nat'l L. J., July 14, 1986, at 4; America's best professional schools:
An exclusive survey of law, medicine, business and engineering school deans, U.S.
News & World Report, Nov. 2, 1987, at 70; University of Rochester Law School Lo-
cator 1988-1989; Jack Gourman, The Gourman Report: A Rating of Graduate and
Professional Programs in American and International Universities (1983).
36. See Rodell, supra note 32, at 285. Professor Rodell calls it a "game of follow
the leader with Harvard Law Review setting the pace."
37. See supra notes 8-32 and accompanying text.
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sible for the reader to determine which particular schools show a
disparity.
The research covered the three year period from 1985
through 1987. For each of these years, the minority population in
each school and on each law review was compiled.38 The law re-
view information was gathered by contacting law review offices di-
rectly.39 Of the twenty law review offices contacted, only one did
not provide the data necessary for the survey.40 The majority was
willing to acquire the needed figures, and most law reviews were
even anxious to know how their schools placed in the tests.41
Some respondents were concerned with "how to define minori-
ties." They were instructed to follow their respective admissions
office definitions42 so that the numbers could be fairly compared.
Some respondents also expressed concern that their figures were
inexact, because no one was responsible for keeping track of di-
verse representation. 43 All precautions have been taken to assure
accurate numbers.44
Once the statistics were collected, the data were tested for
the presence of a disparate impact on minority students.45 There
38. American Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools,
The Official Guide to U.S. Law Schools (1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89). Law schools
provide percentages to this pre-law handbook for the preceding year. When num-
bers were not available, the researcher contacted admissions offices for the
information.
39. The information was provided by editors-in-chief and sometimes by business
managers. Obviously, they had to spend some time verifying their membership
lists. It took approximately two months to obtain accurate numbers from the law
reviews.
40. The editor of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review at the University
of Pennsylvania declined to take part in the survey.
41. Several of the editors contacted requested a copy of the research results
when completed.
42. Minority group members included Asians, Blacks, Hispanics and Native
Americans.
43. Because many schools did not previously keep records of minority represen-
tation on their law reviews, the survey was limited to a three year period. Accu-
racy would have been virtually unattainable had the survey included data from
years prior to 1985.
44. In some cases, editors had been involved with the respective law reviews for
a few years and were able to collect data regarding past and present members on
their own. In other cases, editors enlisted the help of past editors or of someone
involved in tracking minority membership. At some law schools, the business di-
rector had the responsibility of matching membership lists with minority law stu-
dents. Minority student associations were also able to provide detailed lists of
minority law students who had been members of law review during the period
tested.
45. While this article was in the process of publication, the United States
Supreme Court decided Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 57 U.S.L.W. 4583 (1989).
The Wards Cove Packing case will have an effect on the way courts interpret dis-
parate impact claims. Some believe the decision takes "three major strides back-
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is no single clear guideline on how to test statistics for evidence of
disparate impact. In Castaneda v. Partida,46 a case addressing dis-
crimination in the jury selection process, the Supreme Court ap-
proved a test which uses a binomial distribution model.47 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures 48 have also met
with the Court's approval in the employment context.49 Under
these guidelines, adverse impact is presumed if and only if the mi-
nority selection rate is less than 80% of the non-minority selection
rate. 50 Both of the above tests were employed in this study. Re-
sults of the tests are discussed in the following section. 51
In some cases, the Court may be willing to move away from
the above two complicated tests in favor of more easily understood
statistical tests. In a recent opinion,52 Justice O'Connor indicates
the Court's acquiescence to a case-by-case approach to show "sig-
nificance" 53 or "substantiality"54 of disparities. A trend toward
wards" in the area of racial discrimination by ignoring the law as it has been in
effect for eighteen years. Wards Cove Packing, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4593 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
The Wards Cove Packing case involved a Title VII claim by a group of non-
white cannery workers who alleged that a variety of the employer's hiring/promo-
tion practices had a disparate impact on the non-white workers. The three major
changes in the disparate impact analysis made by the Court included: (1) the claim-
ant must show that the statistical disparity complained of is the result of one or
more specific employment practices under attack, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4591; (2) once
claimant proves a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden of production
shifts to defendant, but the burden of persuasion always remains with claimant, id.
at 4588; and (3) the employer's evidence for the business necessity defense need not
show that the challenged practice be essential or indispensable. Id. at 4588.
The Wards Cove Packing decision does not have a major effect on the analogy
presented in this article. However, in light of the Court's digression from the
Griggs standard of business necessity, the author has incorporated Wards Cove
Packing into the article where appropriate.
46. 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 (1977).
47. For a description of the test, see D.H. Kaye, Statistical Evidence of Discrim-
ination in Jury Selection, in Statistical Methods in Discrimination Litigation 17-18
(D. Kaye & M. Aickin eds. 1986).
48. Hereinafter referred to as EEOC Guidelines.
49. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 (1982) (referred to as the "eighty per-
cent rule").
50. Kaye refers to this test as the relative chance (RC) test. For an explanation
of the test, see Kaye, supra note 47, at 19.
51. The complicated binomial distribution test under Castaneda was performed
on a computer program designed by Professor Suzanna Sherry of the University of
Minnesota Law School. Professor Sherry's program calculated and measured stan-
dard deviations in each population, and identified results that were statistically sig-
nificant at the .05 level. Her program, not available for publication, was designed to
test for statistical significance in employment discrimination contexts, using the
Castaneda standard.
52. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S.Ct. 2777 (1988).
53. Id. at 2789 n.3.
54. Id.
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Table 1
The following law schools were contacted for this survey. This list has not
been cross-referenced with the results on Tables 2, 3, or 4 in order to protect
confidentiality.
University of California, Berkeley



















more explainable and easily understood statistics will be heralded
by some. Statisticians have urged lawyers to adopt and use more
understandable, common-sense techniques that present statistical
differences.55 Two techniques which have been suggested by sta-
tistical experts are: (1) relative difference in proportions (RD);56
and (2) relative chance (RC).57 The RD test would show the
probability by which membership on law review is reduced for mi-
norities.58 The RC test would indicate the relative chance a minor-
ity student would have of serving on law review.59 The RC test is
another way of expressing the testing technique recommended by
the EEOC Guidelines. 60 Both of these tests are described in detail
and analyzed in Part III.
Two concerns arose repeatedly during the statistics-gathering
55. See Kaye, supra note 47, at 18-21.
56. Id. at 18-19.
57. Id. at 19.
58. Id. at 18.
59. Id. at 19.
60. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
1989]
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stage of this study. The first concern involved the use of minority
students in the law school population as the comparison sample,
rather than minorities in the general population. The law school
population was the proper comparison sample because it consti-
tuted the "relevant labor market."61 This analysis was made by
analogy to employment discrimination 62 as further explained in
Part III. In the employment discrimination context, the Court ap-
proves the use of a "smaller group of individuals who possess the
necessary qualifications."63 The Supreme Court's most recent de-
cision on employment discrimination stressed the importance of
comparing a "qualified" pool. 64 The minority population at large
would not have the special qualifications needed to apply to law
review.
The second concern was the fact that the minority percentage
in the law school was used for comparison instead of applicant
flow data. An analysis using applicant flow data would have in-
volved using only those minorities who applied to law review as
the comparison sample. A common response to the author's initial
inquiries was "if minorities don't apply, we can't select them." Ap-
plicant flow data have to be "sufficiently reliable"6 5 to be part of
the statistical analysis. For this research, they were not. Most re-
spondents had no way of knowing who among the actual appli-
cants were minority students and who were not. Even if they did,
the applicant population does not include students who are de-
terred from applying because of their perception of discrimination
in the application process itself.66 Courts have approved the con-
cept that applicant flow does not always represent the relevant
population. Some qualified minority students may be discouraged
61. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977).
62. Employment discrimination is proscribed by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). See infra note 70 for language of Act.
63. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13.
64. Although statistical proof alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case,
the prima facie case cannot stand if statistical results are based on an improper
comparison. In Wards Cove Packing, the Court of Appeals had relied on a compar-
ison between the racial composition of the cannery work force and that of the non-
cannery work force, with no question of skill or ability. However, the Supreme
Court found that the proper comparison should have been between the qualified
persons in the labor market and the persons holding the jobs at issue. Wards Cove
Packing, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4586.
65. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 313 n.21.
66. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365-67
(1977). For an explanation of the inaccuracy of using applicant flow as the expected
population, see Elaine Shoben, Defining the Relevant Population in Employment
Discrimination Cases, in Statistical Methods in Discrimination Litigation 57-58 (D.
Kaye & M. Aickin eds. 1986) (citing federal cases which approve of not using appli-
cant flow).
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from applying due to a "self-recognized inability to meet the very
standards challenged as being discriminatory."67 A potential appli-
cant could look at the present and past membership of the law re-
view and "conclude that [it] would be futile [to apply]."6 8 In this
research the law school student body at large was used because it
would include those potential applicants.
One caveat is necessary. The research documented in this ar-
ticle is not an empirical study of all law schools in the United
States, nor does it purport to test a random sample. The law
schools were deliberately chosen because of their prestige and the
caliber of their law reviews. Nevertheless, this article is not meant
as an attack on these most prestigious law reviews, but rather as
an examination of the problem of minority underrepresentation.
It should be viewed as a challenge to law schools and law reviews
to re-examine the selection process and to focus on the dilemma of
disparate impact.
PART III: Analysis
A law review is not an employer in the narrow sense of the
word. The student on law review is analogous to an employee,
however, if one considers such things as hours of work required
and benefits derived from the student's position. There is also a
testing system6 9 for selection, as there would be with many job sit-
uations. For these reasons, this author has chosen to analyze the
law review process as if it were covered by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.70 A plaintiff under Title VII challenging a sta-
67. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (explaining Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 365-67).
68. Id.
69. This "testing system" can involve both grade evaluation and writing evalua-
tion. Some students "grade-on" to law review. Their test takes place with the sub-
jective evaluation of the law professor. Most students "write-on." Their test takes
place with the subjective evaluation of a law review selection committee. Both
methods involve a system that judges the student's writing abilities.
70. Title VII makes it unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any in-
dividual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of ... race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or... to limit, segregate, or classify ... appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
Since the most recent Supreme Court decision has stressed that disparate im-
pact claims must focus "on the impact of particular hiring practices ... ," the au-
thor has identified the particular practice in the law review analogy. Wards Cove
Packing, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4587. But see Wards Cove Packing, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4591




tistical disparity in the workplace must first identify the practice
that is being challenged.71 The specific practice challenged here is
the law review selection process.
The law review selection process could be challenged as dis-
criminatory in either of two ways. 72 One might argue that law re-
view editors intentionally discriminate against minority students.
In a standard employment context, such an argument would give
rise to a disparate treatment claim.73 Alternatively, one could sug-
gest that while the editors do not intentionally deny minority stu-
dents admission to the review, a racially neutral selection process
nevertheless results in a disproportionately low selection of minor-
ities. In a standard employment context, this might give rise to a
disparate impact claim.7 4 The most significant difference between
the two types of claims is that discriminatory intent must be
shown only in a cause of action based on disparate treatment.7 5 A
disparate impact claim would focus on the result as opposed to the
intent. 76
Historically, the Court has applied a disparate impact analysis
primarily when judging objective testing.77 Subjective criteria
have usually been seen as raising only disparate treatment
claims.78 In a recent opinion, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust,7 9 the Court makes disparate impact analysis equally applica-
ble to both subjective and objective criteria. The law review selec-
tion process involves elements of both objective and subjective
criteria. Judging proper Blue BookO footnoting and deciding
whether or not students correctly followed the selection commit-
tee's mandatory format involve objective decisions. Judging the
quality of an applicant's writing style is a subjective decision.
For purposes of this research, the assumption is that under-
representation of minorities on law reviews is not the result of in-
tentional discrimination in the selection process.8 1 The lack of
71. Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2788.





77. This would involve such tests as: written aptitude tests, height and weight
requirements, or written tests of verbal skills. Id. at 2785.
78. Id.
79. 108 S.Ct. 2777 (1988). The Court subsequently affirmed the Watson plural-
ity holding that disparate impact analysis could be applied to hiring practices that
involved subjective criteria. Wards Cove Packing, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4585.
80. A Uniform System of Citation (14th ed. 1986).
81. This assumption is based on the fact that both petitions and law school ex-
ams are "blind graded."
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discriminatory intent, however, does not end the matter. The se-
lection process may be facially neutral, but might still result in a
disparate impact on minority students. Under Title VII, such an
impact would create a prima facie case of discrimination.8 2 The
"thrust" of Title VII was to the "consequence" not the "motiva-
tion" of the selection process.8 3 Therefore, in this article, the con-
sequences of the law review selection process will be analyzed
under the disparate impact theory. The Supreme Court has articu-
lated a three-step disparate impact analysis.84 This analysis in-
cludes: (1) establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact; (2)
showing business necessity; and (3) demonstrating that a less dis-
criminatory alternative means of selection is available.
A. Prima Facie Case
The Court first articulated the disparate impact theory in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 85 In Griggs, however, the Court did not
specify how disparate the impact had to be to state a valid claim
under Title VII. It left open the question, "[H]ow disproportionate
is disproportionate enough?"8 6 In addressing that question, the
Court subsequently has suggested various measures of disparity,
including "substantially higher" selection rates of one group,8 7
"sufficiently large" disparity,8 8 and "gross statistical disparities."8 9
The Court has also referred approvingly to statistical evidence that
is considered merely "sufficient to show" a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact.90
The first evidentiary test presented here is the Castaneda
test.91 This test was first used by the Court to decide whether the
disparity that resulted from a jury selection process involving
Mexican-Americans was sufficient to state a disparate impact
claim. The Court used a binomial distribution model to test the
sample that was selected. This model measures how closely a cho-
sen sample matches an expected value. If the sample is truly ran-
domly chosen (without discrimination), the binomial distribution
82. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971).
83. Id. at 432.
84. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
85. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
86. Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimi-
nation, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540, 560 n.103 (1977).
87. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426.
88. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494.
89. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307.
90. Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2789.
91. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17.
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will fall within the vicinity of the expected value.92 As applied in
Castaneda, this test involved a comparison between the proportion
of Mexican-Americans in the population to the proportion of Mex-
ican-Americans on grand juries.93 The comparison, when plotted
on a binomial distribution scale, revealed a significant variation be-
tween the number of Mexican-Americans jurors expected to be
chosen and the number actually chosen. The resulting standard
deviation score was the deviation from the number which was
expected.94
As applied to the law review case, the Castaneda test would
require a comparison between the expected number95 of minority
law students on law review and the observed number 96 of minority
students on law review. If there are 10% minority students in the
law school, minorities are "expected" to comprise 10% of all stu-
dents on law review in the absence of discrimination. If the ex-
pected and observed values show a difference of "greater than two
or three standard deviations,"97 there is a sufficient disparity for a
prima facie case of discrimination under the Castaneda test.98 It
should be noted that Castaneda is a disparate treatment case. The
plaintiffs in Castaneda used the statistics as evidence of the de-
fendant's discriminatory intent. Meeting the Castaneda test
should automatically give rise to a disparate impact claim, as a dis-
parate impact claim does not require the heavier burden of proving
intent.
Applying the Castaneda test in this research, sixteen of the
nineteen sampled law schools were found to show statistical dis-
parities above two standard deviations. These results are listed on
Table 2. The disparities ranged from -.6899 to 6.76 standard devia-
tions. According to the results of these calculations, only three of
the nineteen schools "passed" the Castaneda test, showing no sig-
nificant disparate impact. The law review selection processes of
92. Id.
93. Id. at 495-96.
94. Id. at 497 n.17.
95. "Expected" minority students as law review members would be the same
percentage as minority students in the law school class.
96. "Observed" number would be those minority students actually on law re-
view, as reported by the editor-in-chief or business manager for each year surveyed.
97. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497 n.17.
98. Id. at 496.
99. The negative score means that school "S" not only had no showing of dispa-
rate impact, but that minority students actually were better represented on law re-
view than in the general law school population. School "S" had an expected value
of 17% in the student body, but an observed value of 18.5% minorities on law
review.
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the remaining sixteen schools had a demonstrated disparate im-
pact on minority students.
The numbers for individual years 0 0 were combined for the
results on Table 2. This aggregate testing was necessary due to the
difficulty in using the Castaneda test for a small sample size.101
Combined data is more likely to exclude chance as the cause of
disparities when the sample size is small.102
Under the Castaneda test, minority law students at all but
three of the schools could make a sufficient prima facie showing of
disparate impact. This prima facie showing would render the se-
lection process presumedly unlawful if Title VII were applied to
the law review selection process.
The courts10 3 have also used the EEOC's Uniform Guidelines
on Employment Selection ProcedureslO4 as a standard for testing
discrimination. According to the "eighty percent rule"105 articu-
lated in the Guidelines,10 6 "a selection rate for any race, sex, or
ethnic group which is less than [80%] of the rate for the group
with the highest [selection] rate will generally be regarded . . . as
evidence of adverse impact."'1 7 The eighty percent rule can also
be expressed as a "relative chance"' 0 8 measurement. This test was
performed for this article by comparing the probability of selection
for any given minority student' 0 9 with the probability of selection
for any given non-minority student.110 If the relative chance"l of
selection for minority students is less than 80% of that of the non-
100. The individual years tested were 1986, 1987, and 1988.
101. For a discussion of the problems with testing a small sample size such a law
review membership, see Kaye, supra note 47, at 18-24. See also Barbara Schlei &
Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law (2d ed. 1983).
102. Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 336 n.17 (4th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
103. Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2789 n.3 (explanation of various tests applied by lower
courts).
104. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1988).
105. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 n.3 (1982).
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1988).
107. Id.
108. Kaye, supra note 47, at 19.
109. Mathematically, the probability of selection for minority students could be
described as follows:
p(s for m) =
% on law review - % in law school
110. Mathematically, this would be the same test as in note 109, supra, except
with the non-minority population:
p(s for non-m) =
% on law review - % in law school
111. Mathematically, the relative chance of selection would be determined by di-
viding the result of the test in note 109, supra, by the result of the test in note 110,
supra:
p(s for m) + p(s for non-m)
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Table 2 - Castaneda Test
A B C D E F G H I J KL MN O P QR S
Disparate Impact
U No Disparate Impact
minority students, there is a significant disparity according to the
EEOC Guidelines. This test may not be as statistically reliable1 ' 2
as the Castaneda test, but it is more useful where the sample size
is small, as it was in this study.113
Applying the EEOC Guidelines test to the data, the study
found that only two of the sampled law reviews had a minority se-
lection rate of at least 80% of the non-minority selection rate.
Thus, only two law reviews would have "passed" the Guidelines
test. As Table 3 illustrates, the selection rate for minority students
went from a low of 0% to a high of 111%. The low of 0% means
that in three of the sampled schools, the minority student's chance
of being selected was 0% that of the non-minority student's chance
of being selected. The three law reviews selected no minority stu-
dents as members for 1986, 1987 or 1988. These three schools had
minority populations ranging from 7% to 13%. However, in school
112. Watson, 108 S.Ct. 2789 n.3 (commenting that the test has been criticized on
"technical" grounds).
113. Kaye, supra note 47, at 19-20.
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Table 3 - EEOC Guidelines
NN JINN
A B C DE F G H I J K L MN OP Q R S
Fail EEOC 80%
U] Pass EEOC 80%
"S," which had a minority selection rate of 111%, the minority stu-
dent's chance of selection for law review was better than that of
non-minority students.
Law school "Q" on Table 3, with a selection rate of 77%,
failed the EEOC Guidelines test, although it passed the Castaneda
test." 4 This conflict suggested that further analysis was necessary.
This further analysis revealed that school "Q" may be in flux.
Breaking down the results of the Guidelines test on an individual-
year basis shows that:
1986 = Failed (minority rate only 71% of non-minority)
1987 = Failed (minority rate only 70% of non-minority)
1988 = Passed (minority rate 90% of non-minority)
The 1988 rate was responsible for bringing the school within three
percentage points of passing the EEOC Guidelines test on an ag-
gregrate basis.
114. This is an example of why the Castaneda test is not always useful when
testing small sample sizes and, at the same time, an example of the statistical unre-
liability of the eighty percent rule (not statistically significant for this school).
Law and Inequality
Schools "R" and "S" are the only schools that passed under
both the Castaneda test and the EEOC Guidelines test. School
"R," with 1.74 standard deviations under the Castaneda test (Table
2), scored an 84% selection rate under the EEOC Guidelines test
(Table 3). On an individual-year basis, the results for school "R"
under the EEOC eighty percent rule were:
1986 = Failed (minority rate only 27% of non-minority)
1987 = Failed (minority rate only 72% of non-minority)
1988 = Passed (minority rate 150%)
As with school "Q," described above, the 1988 year was also re-
sponsible for a passing rate on an aggregate basis for school "R."
As with the Castaneda test, the evidence from this second
test also shows a pervasive disparity resulting from the selection
process. The EEOC Guidelines test has shown "evidence of ad-
verse impact"115 in the majority of the schools surveyed.
The final test used in this study is the relative difference
test,116 the results of which are documented on Table 4. The Court
has given general recognition to this type of testing, reflecting that
decisions are developing on a "case-by-case approach."117 Thus,
the Court is willing to consider and examine various types of sta-
tistical analyses and explanations in any given case. "[S]tatistics
... come in infinite variety .... [T]heir usefulness depends on all
of the surrounding facts and circumstances.", 18 The relative dif-
ference test is a variety of test that may prove helpful for non-
statisticians.
The test results found on Table 4 are introduced in response
to requests for understandable, common-sense statistics. Courts
have expressed concern that discrimination cases have become
nothing more than "contests between college professor statisticians
who revel in discoursing about advanced statistical theory." 119 The
relative difference test meets no particular statistical significance
standard, but rather should be considered along with other facts
and evidence in a disparate impact case. It may prove helpful to
the "statistically unsophisticated" judge. 120
The "relative difference in proportions"121 test is used to de-
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1988).
116. Kaye, supra note 47, at 18.
117. Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2789 n.3.
118. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. 299, 312 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 340 (1977)).
119. Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist., 470 F. Supp. 326, 331 (D. Colo.
1979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir. 1980).
120. Garrett v. R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 25, 32-34 (M.D.N.C.
1978).
121. Kaye, supra note 47, at 18.
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Table 4 - Relative Difference Test
rJ
A BC D EF G H I J KL MN OP QR S
% Reduction in chance for selection
No reduction for selection
termine the "proportion by which the probability of [being se-
lected] is reduced"122 for minority students. If a minority student
has the same chance of being selected for law review as the non-
minority student, then the relative difference (RD)123 would be
zero. The expected chance of a minority student being selected is
the proportion by which minorities are represented in the law
school. If a minority student's chance of selection is lower than
what it should be, then the relative difference (RD) would be
somewhere between zero and one.12 4 As the score increases from
zero to one, the disparate impact also increases.
Table 4 lists the results of this test.125 The scores range from




125. Mathematically, this test was performed by subtracting the observed value
from the expected value and then dividing the result by the observed value. See id.
minority student's chance of selection =
(% minor, in school - % minor, on 1.r.) + % minor, in school
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student's chance of membership is reduced by 100%. This is as
great a reduction as possible. A score of ''1" only occurred in the
schools where no minorities were selected as members of law re-
view for the three year period of testing. Three of the schools sur-
veyed selected no minorities. The negative score of "-.09"
indicates that the chance of membership was not reduced for mi-
nority students but was, in fact, increased.
Using this test, minority students' chances of being selected
for law review were considerably less than they should have been
in all but one law school. Only school "S" showed no reduction in
the selection chance for minority students. At best, a minority stu-
dent's expected chance of selection was reduced by 20%. At worst,
a minority student's expected chance of selection was reduced by
100%.
The above analysis has presented several different methods
of testing disparate impact. The Supreme Court, the federal gov-
ernment, and leading statisticians have recognized and accepted
the reliability of these tests. The tests, as applied to the data gath-
ered from twenty top law schools, show that the law review selec-
tion process has a disparate impact on minority law students.
Differences in the results of the three tests were only minuscule.
At best, three schools showed no discrimination; at worst, only one
showed none. Under current Title VII standards, these statistics
meet the burden of showing a prima facie case of disparate impact.
B. Business Necessity
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant.126 The de-
fendant must show that the procedure at issue is justified by
business necessity. 127 What constitutes an adequate business ne-
cessity defense is still being debated in the courts.
The Supreme Court first set up the parameters of the defend-
126. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425; and Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329. In her plural-
ity opinion in Watson, Justice O'Connor suggested that the burden of proof always
remained with the plaintiff. Three concurring justices disagreed with this interpre-
tation of the burdens under disparate impact. Watson, 108 S.Ct. 2777. In Wards
Cove Packing, the Court clearly states that the "burden of producing evidence of a
business justification" shifts to defendant, while the "burden of persuasion ... re-
mains with the disparate-impact plaintiff." The Court recognizes that this is not
the interpretation given by earlier decisions. Wards Cove Packing, 57 U.S.L.W. at
4588. It should be noted that for the new interpretation of burden shifting, "[tihe
majority's only basis for this proposition is the plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust . . . which in turn cites no authority." Wards Cove Packing,
57 U.S.L.W. at 4591 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
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ant's burden in Griggs by requiring "business necessity"128 as the
acceptable defense to a prima facie disparate impact claim. How-
ever, the Court did not define the specifics of what would consti-
tute "necessity." The Griggs opinion confused the burden of proof
by interchanging the standard to be met as a significant relation-
ship to successful job performance,129 a business necessity,130 or a
manifest relationship to employment. 131 Thus, the lower courts
have had to grapple with the problem of defining a business
necessity.
Many of the United States Courts of Appeals have applied
the Griggs standard narrowly. Their decisions have interpreted
the Court's intent in Griggs as making the employer's burden a
difficult one.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit requires that a
defendant show an "overriding legitimate business purpose" that is
"sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact ... ,"132 It
has been suggested that the court here is applying a balancing test
to the business necessity defense. 133 However, the court makes
clear that it is not balancing the disparate impact against "merely
[the existence of] a business purpose .... ,,134 Rather, there must
be a "compelling" business necessity, with a validated correlation
and no alternative policies with less racial impact.135 This is not a
balance, but a tolerance level below which the court is unwilling to
go.
In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. ,136 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit also maintained a narrow business ne-
cessity defense application. This court defined the necessity as "an
irresistible demand" that was essential to safety and efficiency.137
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit characterized the
business necessity defense as a "heavy burden"'138 that could only
be met by a "compelling need."139 The strict business necessity in-
128. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
129. Id. at 426.
130. Id. at 431.
131. Id. at 432.
132. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 1007 (1971).
133. Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability
Under Title VII, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 911, 919 (1979).
134. Robinson v. Lorilard, 444 F.2d at 798.
135. Id.
136. 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
137. Id. at 662.
138. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 1983).




terpretations by these lower courts140 have established that a mere
legitimate business purpose is an unacceptable defense.
Other courts have interpreted the Griggs necessity test more
broadly. In Contreras v. City of Los Angeles,141 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that an employer could satisfy the
burden of proof without showing an absolute business necessity.
In so doing, the court attempted to "harmonize" its earlier cases,
which presented a dichotomy in the application of the business ne-
cessity standard.
In two earlier cases, Craig v. County of Los Angeles142 and
deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School District,143 the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied a broad standard to the employer's burden of business
necessity. 144 In these two decisions, the court "treated 'job related-
ness' and 'business necessity' as interchangeable terms, neither of
which required proof that the challenged policy was absolutely
necessary . *."..,145 Yet, in Blake v. City of Los Angeles,146 this
same court applied a narrow reading of business necessity. The
court distinguished its restrictive application of business necessity
in Blake by explaining that it had incorrectly interpreted Con-
gress' intent regarding the employer's burden of proof under Title
VII. 1 47 The proper interpretation in Blake, according to the court,
would have followed the Supreme Court's decision in New York
Transit Authority v. Beazer.148
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reads Beazer as
"implicitly [approving] employment practices that significantly
serve, but are neither required by nor necessary to, the employer's
legitimate business interests."149 This interpretation is overly
140. See also, Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 906 (1972); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979); Liberles
v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1983); Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. New
Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 625 F. Supp. 527 (D.N.J. 1985); Black Law Enforcement
Officers Ass'n v. City of Akron, 824 F.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1987).
141. 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
142. 626 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).
143. 588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978).
144. Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1276 (explaining earlier decisions in Craig and
deLaurier).
145. Id.
146. 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980).
147. Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1278.
148. Id. at 1279-80 (interpreting New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568 (1979)). Beazer involved a claim that the Transit Authority's rule denying em-
ployment to persons in methadone maintenance programs violated Title VII by ex-
cluding a disproportionate number of Hispanics and Blacks. In reversing a finding
of a prima facie case of discrimination by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, the Supreme Court focused on the statistical proof and public safety issues.
149. Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1280 (emphasis added).
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broad considering that the Court in Beazer focused on the safety
component' 5 0 of business necessity and the problem of using the
proper statistical pool. If the Ninth Circuit is correct, Beazer
would effectively overrule Griggs.151
The Supreme Court would not leave to implication the over-
ruling of a precedent as pervasive as Griggs. Recently, the Court
was presented with an opportunity, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio,152 to overrule Griggs and declined to do so. It is certain
that the Wards Cove Packing decision somewhat diminishes the
business necessity requirement of Griggs. It is less certain that
this latest decision will do anything to help the courts to define the
specifics of what constitutes an acceptable justification.
In Wards Cove Packing, the Court begins its discussion of the
employer's burden by reference to a "business justification," lead-
ing one to believe that this is a decrease in the Griggs standard.
The Court then reverts to the term "business necessity defense"
only two paragraphs later, seemingly reinstating the Griggs stan-
dard, whatever it may be.153
In Wards Cove Packing, the Court tries to set a standard for
the divergent United States Courts of Appeals decisions by clearly
stating that "the challenged practice need not be 'essential' or 'in-
dispensable' to the employer's business . . . ."15 This may offer
guidance to the courts that specifically used those terms in their
deliberations and decisions, but will prove of little aid to the courts
still grappling with the substantive issue of the level of necessity.
This is especially true in light of the fact that the Court in Wards
Cove Packing further states that the challenged practice must "in
a significant way" serve the goals of the employer.155 If the Court
had intended to wipe out the disparate impact standard set forth in
Griggs, it could have ruled that the employer need only come for-
ward with any reasonable business justification, as is the em-
ployer's burden in a disparate treatment case. Rather, the Court
150. Some courts have interpreted Griggs as requiring a lighter burden for job
necessity when safety of the public is involved. See Spurlock v. United Airlines,
Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
151. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, set up a more difficult burden (necessity) for the
employer to meet in disparate impact claims. If this burden is lessened by the
Ninth Circuit holdings, it becomes merely the same as that for disparate treatment
cases, which requires the employer only to articulate a reason for the selection.
152. 57 U.S.L.W. 4584 (1989).
153. It is also confusing in that the Court cites Griggs when referring to a "sig-
nificant" business justification, but blatantly misquotes Griggs by saying, "The
touchstone ... is a reasoned review .... Id. at 4588. Griggs said, "The touchstone
is business necessity." 401 U.S. at 431.




chose to explain that a "mere insubstantial justification . . . will
not suffice, because... [it] would permit discrimination to be prac-
ticed through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employment
practices."'156 Thus, while seeming to lessen the employer's bur-
den, the most recent Court decision can only be read as still de-
manding a substantial justification for the defense of business
necessity.
Griggs established an arduous task by demanding that a de-
fendant show a significant relationship to job performance. Wards
Cove Packing has affirmed that requirement by demanding a sub-
stantial justification. This standard has been watered down by
some courts simply to mean any relationship to the job. If the
broad application of business necessity is accepted, it blurs seri-
ously the distinction between disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment cases. 157 The Court has not to date articulated a desire
completely to mesh these two. Employers should, therefore, con-
tinue to be held to a narrow application of business justification.
Under this narrow interpretation, law reviews must provide evi-
dence that their present selection process has a substantial rela-
tionship to job performance.
Once a law review offers the business necessity defense, how
does it show a manifest relationship or correlation to perform-
ance? Again, court decisions have not provided clear mandates.
There is no specific formula with which to validate business neces-
sity, but the selection process "must bear more than an indirect or
minimal relationship to job performance.'158 It should be noted
that the defendant in Contreras presented impressive validation
testimony from several job analysis experts and auditors.159 Thus,
though the Ninth Circuit appears to apply "a seemingly less bur-
densome test,"16 0 the Contreras decision could be interpreted as
giving deference to the extensive validation studies presented in
that case.
The Court has allowed some selection tests with a disparate
impact on minorities to stand even though the tests' relationships
to actual job "performance" could not be demonstrated.161 In
156. Id.
157. Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2791-93 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining the dif-
ference between the employer's difficult burden in disparate impact cases and eas-
ier burden in disparate treatment cases).
158. Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2794 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159. Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1281-82.
160. Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983).
161. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that test did not violate
equal protection even though it had a disparate impact on minorities because de-
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Washington v. Davis,162 plaintiffs challenged a test used to select
police recruits for a training program because the test excluded a
disproportionate number of minorities. The Court held that the
test was permitted for its narrow "purpose of predicting ability to
master a training program."'163 The test did not predict "ability to
perform"'164 the job. As explained by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the Court in Washington approved a narrow use of
the test "to measure trainability irrespective of the test's possible
relationship to actual performance on the job ... ,"165 This partic-
ular type of test is limited strictly to demonstrating whether "an
employee had the rudimentary skills necessary to be put into a
training program."166 The law review selection process measures
neither trainability nor rudimentary skills. Thus, the Washington
defense would not be applicable to law reviews because the only
measurement being correlated here is the ability to perform the
actual job.
In Albemarle, the Court clarified the appropriate standard to
validate job relatedness.167 In so doing, the Court relied on the
EEOC Guidelines as providing the professionally acceptable meth-
ods of correlation.168 Under this method of validation, law reviews
would have to offer statistical proof that their selection method of
judging writing style and content shows a direct relationship to the
way members actually perform on law review. Regardless of
which way the cases have been decided, courts have consistently
relied on validation studies to prove job relatedness.169
The EEOC Guidelines allow three methods of validation: cri-
terion, content, and construct.170 Validation "involves issues and
problems which are outside the experience of most lay[people]."'171
fendants were able to justify the test as it applied to completion of a training
program).
162. Id.
163. Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2790-91 (explaining Washington v. Davis).
164. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 250.
165. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1494, 1503 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis
added).
166. Id.
167. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431-35.
168. Id. at 431.
169. Id.; see also cases cited supra note 140; but see Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 816 (8th Cir. 1983) ("We cannot say ... that validation studies are
always required .... ).
170. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1988), 28 C.F.R. § 50.14 (1988). For a description and ex-
planation of the validating tests, see Joel W. Friedman & George M. Strickler, Jr.,
The Law of Employment Discrimination 253-54 (2d ed. 1987).
171. Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of
New York, 633 F.2d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (quoting Vul-
can Society of the New York City Fire Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York,
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Experts are engaged to evaluate whether an objective test is doing
what it was designed to do. Applying these same expert methods
to a subjective test may prove an impossible task. Though the
Court has said that these Guidelines are "entitled to great defer-
ence," 172 this method of validation to test subjective criteria is an
impossible burden.173
Since the law review selection process involves a subjective
test, it is doubtful that a court would hold law reviews to the im-
possible burden of validation studies. In order for law reviews to
present the necessary empirical evidence, they would literally have
to choose members who fail their selection criteria and then un-
biasedly measure the job performance of these members. Valida-
tion studies are appropriate for some criteria used in the law
review selection process. However, no technical or mathematical
standard of proof is possible. This does not suggest that the de-
fendant's burden is lessened, but rather that the correlation must
be shown by other means. As Justice Blackmun explains, the ab-
sence of "mathematical certainty does not free an employer from
its burden . . . ," but rather demands that the employer use an-
other method.174
Thus, a law review carries the burden of providing substan-
tial evidence that its subjective testing method is job related,
although no mathematical standard of proof is possible. It is doubt-
ful that the law reviews will be able to meet their burden in com-
pliance with Griggs.
C. Alternative Means
The final strand of a disparate impact action shifts the bur-
den back to the plaintiff. Even if a law review met the require-
ments for business necessity, the plaintiff could still "show that
other . . . selection devices, without [an] . . . undesirable racial ef-
fect, would also [accomplish the goal]." 175 A discussion of various
360 F. Supp. 1265, 1272-73 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 490 F.2d 387
(2d Cir. 1973)).
172. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434.
173. The Court recognized the difficulty of applying validation standards to sub-
jective selection processes in Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2795 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"[Plersonal qualities ... have never been considered amenable to standardized test-
ing." Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2791. "(Flormal validation techniques ... may some-
times not be effective in measuring the job-relatedness of subjective-selection
processes .... " Watson at 2795 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
174. Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2796 (Blackmun, J. concurring). In his concurring
opinion in Watson, Justice Blackmun suggests a "variety of methods" that an em-
ployer can use to validate the job relatedness of a subjective test. Id. at 2796.
175. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
[Vol. 7:459
THE LAW REVIEW SELECTION PROCESS
courts' application of this segment of disparate impact actions is
beyond the scope of this article. The following section, however,
suggests some alternative options for law reviews.
PART VI: Remedies
Based on the statistical evidence, the disparate impact of the
law review selection process must be recognized. Law reviews are
faced with several choices.
One option is that of making no change in the present selec-
tion process. Law review editors might discuss their selection pro-
cess 176 and decide that the system is working satisfactorily. The
affirmative defense of job relatedness is always available with this
option.177 Law reviews could argue that the selection process is an
accurate measure of how well students will perform the law re-
view tasks. Objectively, competitors must be able to footnote prop-
erly. Subjectively, competitors must be able to write well. This
justification, however, is not without problems.
The subjective part of the test raises important issues. Sev-
eral scholars have debated whether law review editors should be
the ones to judge what is or is not good writing.178 The writing
style of articles published in law reviews regularly comes under at-
tack.17 9 Furthermore, those who are invited to join law review on
the basis of their grades are not judged by the same people nor,
perhaps, by the same standards as those who submit petitions; yet,
both seem to be performing their jobs satisfactorily. 80 This is the
same problem faced in establishing job relatedness in Al-
bemarle.18 1 In light of the clear disparate impact and the unlikeli-
hood of establishing job relatedness, law reviews should consider
further options.
A second option involves instituting an aggressive affirmative
action plan. For instance, a law review could set a goal for a cer-
tain number of slots for minority members based upon the minor-
176. Professor Rotunda believes that law reviews debate their selection proce-
dures about every five years. Rotunda, supra note 2, at 11.
177. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229.
178. See generally Rodell, supra note 32; Rotunda, supra note 2; Perry, supra
note 86; see also Paul M. Barrett, To Read This Story in Full, Don't Forget to See
the Footnotes, Wall St. J., May 10, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
179. Barrett, supra note 178.
180. See generally Riggs, supra note 9.
181. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 432-33. The Court was concerned because no one
could tell "precisely what criteria of job performance the supervisors were consid-
ering, whether each of the supervisors was considering the same criteria or
whether, indeed, any of the supervisors actually applied a focused and stable body
of criteria of any kind."
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ity population in the law school. It could then select the minority
students with the top scores in the subjective/objective writing
competition. Both of the law reviews that showed no disparate im-
pact in testing for this article (schools "R" and "S" on the Ta-
bles)18 2 have affirmative action programs in place. Interestingly,
minority representation on the law reviews in these schools in-
creased each successive year of the survey span. School "R"
reserves the right to add a number of law review positions per
year exclusively for minority students. These positions are in addi-
tion to those available to students through the regular competition
process. While some law schools embrace affirmative action plans
to end discriminatory selection results, others resist the idea.'8 3
Therefore, this option may work for some law reviews but not for
others.
A final option is one that allows a law review to take positive
steps toward ending discrimination without instituting extensive
immediate changes. This third option balances those discussed
above with a less aggressive program for achieving racial balance.
It may begin by openly discussing the whole application process
with minority students. School "S," which scored highest in mi-
nority representation on all tests, undertook such a plan by em-
ploying "intensive recruitment of minority students."184 This
recruitment involved discussions with minority students which
both criticized past selection processes and developed techniques
for increasing participation on future law reviews.
This option could also involve changing the petition process
from the standard law review writing style competition to a more
individualized process. One commentator suggests examining two
or three short discussions prepared as part of a student's course
work and submitted during the year.18 5 With this plan, a law re-
view would have the benefit of reading several short works, from
each student on diverse legal subjects, giving varying viewpoints.
The students would have the benefit of expressing themselves on
different areas of the law and at different times during the school
year.
Law reviews might also want to consider a process that solic-
its essays on personal issues. School "R" went from a minority
representation of 3% in 1986 to 16% in 1988186 after introducing a
182. These two schools "passed" both the Castaneda test and the EEOC test. See
Table 2, supra p. 474 and Table 3, supra p. 475.
183. Adams, supra note 33.
184. Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of school "S" law review.
185. Westwood, supra note 4, at 915.
186. Percentages reported by Editor-in-Chief in interview.
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petitioning process which required a personal essay on racial diver-
sification along with submission of a standard legal writing sample.
Law reviews would thus give recognition to the advantages of cul-
tural diversity on a legal journal.187
This option has the further advantage of taking into account
the differences between minority and non-minority writing styles
due to different cultural and social backgrounds. Many minority
students approach the law review writing competition from a to-
tally different institutional perspective than their white counter-
parts.18 8 Writing programs in colleges traditionally attended by
minorities have been shown to differ from writing programs in tra-
ditionally white colleges.' 8 9 These differences range from the ade-
quacy of library facilities to the availability of specialized courses
oriented toward the legal profession. 190 Discrimination through
"societal defects" may systematically be built into the Case Com-
ment or Note format traditionally used for law review
applications.
This option in no way suggests lowering standards for mem-
bership on law review, but rather changing the present standards
that merely maintain past discriminatory practices. Considering
the influence race has had on legal doctrine, 191 minority view-
points and life experiences must be taken into account when law
reviews formulate their selection processes.
Conclusion
When the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,192 it intended to provide minority students with equal access
to our educational system. The Court did not intend equality of
opportunity to stop once inside the classroom door, but instead in-
tended that it extend to all aspects of education. This has not been
the case in law school. This article has shown that one of the pri-
mary tools of learning in law school has been denied to minority
law students. The legal research and writing techniques attained
through membership on law review are not accessible to minorities
in the top law schools. In all three legally recognized statistical
187. Brooks, supra note 21, at 13 n.40.
188. See United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Black/White Colleges:
Dismantling the Dual System of Higher Education (1981); United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights, Toward Equal Educational Opportunity: Affirmative Admis-
sions Programs at Law & Medical Schools (1978).
189. See The Black/White Colleges: supra note 188; Toward Equal Educational
Opportunity, supra note 188.
190. The Black/White Colleges, supra note 188, at 19.
191. Brooks, supra note 21, at 14 n.41.
192. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tests, the law review selection process resulted in a disparate im-
pact on racial minorities.
In the past fifteen years, the minority population in law
school has quadrupled. 193 Yet, discrimination continues to exist
within the "best technique of education which our schools have de-
vised ... "194 Law reviews may be blameless in intent, but they
cannot maintain a selection process that "operate[s] to 'freeze' the
status quo of prior discriminatory . . .practices."195 The "strait-
jacket"196 style of law reviews may be in line with the way white
establishments have taught writing and thinking. Minority educa-
tional, familial, and social backgrounds, however, may not mesh
with the writing style judged as "good" by the subjective standards
used in law school.197 If this is the case, the disparate impact will
continue in our nation's law schools and within the legal profes-
sion. As the pinnacle of legal education, a law review has an obli-
gation to improve its selection process to eliminate discrimination.
The current process perpetuates bias. It is time for law reviews to
change their selection processes and guarantee minority students
the same access to benefits as that enjoyed by their white
counterparts.
193. Law School Admission Council/Law School Admission Services, Minority
Applicants and the Law (1988) (brochure).
194. Westwood, supra note 4, at 915.
195. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
196. Rodell, supra note 32, at 282.
197. Perry argues that the "motivation and cognitive development" of minorities
has been impeded by poverty, "two centuries of slavery and discrimination," and
"racially isolated environments." Perry, supra note 86, at 557-59. See also The
Black/White Colleges, supra note 188.
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